

Implementation of MDC-2 with AES-hash Function

Nway Htet Myat, Myat Su Win

University of Computer Studies, Taung-ngu, Myanmar

nwayko83@gmail.com, myattsuro@gmail.com

Abstract

Cryptographic hash functions are a third type of cryptographic algorithm. They take a message of any length as input, and output a short, fixed length hash which can be used in (for example) a digital signature. As digital signature technology becomes more widely understood and utilized, many countries worldwide are competitively developed their own signature standards for their use and applications. Hash functions are the mathematical algorithms that transform arbitrary length sequences of bits into a hash result of a fixed, limited length. And they are used in many cryptographic protocols. Currently, hash functions based on block cipher used in many of the cryptographic applications. This paper will propose a hash function which is based on AES algorithm and it is the modified version of MDC-2 algorithm to perform efficiently the iteration of compression function for message with huge length. Keywords: hash function, AES, DES, MDC-2, message digest.

1. Introduction

Hash function is a fundamental tool in Information Security. In its simplest form a hash function is an algorithm that takes an input of any size and outputs a fixed length "hash code" that is, in some sense, difficult to predict in advance. That is, the output of the hash function serves as a digital fingerprint for the input and should be the same each time the same message is hashed. Hash functions are used to help provide data integrity in Message Authentication Codes (MACs), to produce message digests for use with digital signature schemes and to produce Manipulation Detection Codes (MDCs) in entity authentication and key establishment schemes.

For a hash function to be secured it is required to be one-way and collision resistant. The one-way property can be achieved if it is easy to generate the message digest of a message but, is hard to determine the original message when the digest of it is known. On the other hand, collision resistance can be attained if it is hard to find two different messages, having same message digest as output. Apart from these requirements, the hash function

should be accepting a message of any size as input and computation of the message digest must be fast and efficient. Signing the message digest rather than the message often improves the efficiency of the process because the message digest is usually much smaller than the message. [1, 4]

2. Background Theory

In this section, cryptographic hash function and modification detection code (MDC-2) are presented as background theory.

2.1 Cryptographic Hash Function

Cryptographic hash functions play a fundamental role in modern cryptography. Hash functions take a message as input and produce an output referred to as a hash-code, hash-result, hash-value, or simply hash. Cryptographic hash functions are used for data integrity and message authentication.

The basic idea of cryptographic hash functions is that a hash-value serves as a compact representative image (sometimes called an imprint, digital fingerprint, or message digest) of an input string, and can be used as if it were uniquely identifiable with that string.

Hash functions are used for data integrity in conjunction with digital signature schemes, where for several reasons a message is typically hashed first, and then the hash-value, as a representative of the message, is signed in place of the original message. A distinct class of hash functions, called message authentication codes (MACs), allows message authentication by symmetric techniques. MAC algorithms may be viewed as hash functions which take two functionally distinct inputs, a message and a secret key, and produce a fixed-size (say n-bit) output, with the design intent that it be infeasible in practice to produce the same output without knowledge of the key. MACs can be used to provide data integrity and symmetric data origin authentication, as well as identification in symmetric-key schemes. [1, 7]

Sometimes a MAC is called a keyed hash function, but then one has to use for an MDC the artificial term un-keyed or keyless hash function. According to their properties, the class of MDC's

will be further divided into one-way hash functions (OWHF) and collision resistant hash functions (CRHF). [4, 5]

The hash function will be denoted with h , and its argument, i.e., the information to be protected with M . The image of M under the hash function h will be denoted with $h(M)$ and the secret key with K .

2.1.1 Types of Hash Function

At the highest level, hash functions may be split into two classes:

- **Unkeyed Hash Functions**, whose specification dictates a single input parameter (a message) and
- **Keyed Hash Functions**, whose specification dictates two distinct inputs, a message and a secret key.

2.1.2 Properties of Hash Function

A cryptographic hash function must be able to withstand all known types of cryptanalytic attack. As a minimum, it must have the following properties:

- **Preimage resistance** - Given a hash h it should be hard to find any message m such that $h = \text{hash}(m)$. This concept is related to that of one-way function. Functions that lack this property are vulnerable to preimage attacks.
- **Second preimage resistance** - Given an input m_1 it should be hard to find another input m_2 — where $m_1 \neq m_2$ — such that $\text{hash}(m_1) = \text{hash}(m_2)$. This property is sometimes referred to as weak collision resistance, and functions that lack this property are vulnerable to second preimage attacks. [8]
- **Collision resistance** - It should be hard to find two different messages m_1 and m_2 such that $\text{hash}(m_1) = \text{hash}(m_2)$. Such a pair is called a cryptographic hash collision, a property which is sometimes referred to as strong collision resistance. It requires a hash value at least twice as long as that required for preimage-resistance, otherwise collisions may be found by a birthday attack. [1,2,4]

2.2 Modification Detection Codes (MDC)

A move from general properties and constructions to specific hash functions is now made, and in this section the subclass of unkeyed hash functions known as modification detection codes (MDCs) is considered. From a structural viewpoint, these may be categorized based on the nature of the operations comprising their internal compression functions.

2.2.1 Single-length MDCs

Single-length hash functions based on block ciphers make use of the following predefined components:

- a generic n -bit block cipher E_K parameterized by a symmetric key K ;
- a function g which maps n -bit inputs to keys K suitable for E (if keys for E are also of length n , g might be the identity function); and
- a fixed (usually n -bit) initial value IV , suitable for use with E .

2.2.2 Double-length MDCs

MDC-2 and MDC-4 are manipulation detection codes requiring 2 and 4, respectively, block cipher operations per block of hash input. They employ a combination of either 2 or 4 iterations of the Matyas-Meyer-Oseas (single-length) scheme to produce a double-length hash. When used as originally specified, using DES as the underlying block cipher, they produce 128-bit hash-codes. The general construction, however, can be used with other block ciphers. [1]

2.3 MDC-2 (DES-based)

MDC-2 makes use of the following pre-specified components:

- Use DES algorithm as the block cipher E_K of bit length $n = 64$ parameterized by a 56-bit key K ;
- Two functions g and \tilde{g} which map 64-bit values U to suitable 56-bit DES keys as follows. For $U = u_1u_2 \dots u_{64}$, delete every eighth bit starting with u_8 , and set the 2nd and 3rd bits to '10' for g , and '01' for \tilde{g} :

$$g(U) = u_1 1 0 u_4 u_5 u_6 u_7 u_9 u_{10} \dots u_{63}$$

$$\tilde{g}(U) = u_1 0 1 u_4 u_5 u_6 u_7 u_9 u_{10} \dots u_{63}$$

MDC-2 is illustrated in Figure 1. (E = DES cipher encryption)




Figure 1. MDC-2 hash function

INPUT: string x of bit length $r = 64t$ for $t \geq 2$.

OUTPUT: 128-bit hash-code of x .

1. Partition x into 64-bit blocks x_i : $x = x_1x_2 \dots x_t$.
2. Choose the 64-bit non-secret constants IV, \tilde{IV} (the same constants must be used for MDC verification) from a set of recommended prescribed values. A default set of prescribed values is (in hexadecimal):
 $IV = 0x5252525252525252,$
 $\tilde{IV} = 0x2525252525252525.$
3. Let \parallel denote concatenation, and C_i^L, \tilde{C}_i^R the left and right 32-bit halves of C_i . The output is $h(x) = H_t \parallel \tilde{H}_t \cdot [1, 3]$

Figure 2. MDC-2 hash function algorithm

3. System Implementation

The proposed hash function h is designed as iterative processes which hash arbitrary length inputs (any text) by processing successive fixed-size blocks of the input, as illustrated in Figure 3. A hash input x of arbitrary finite length is divided into fixed-length 256-bit blocks x_i . This preprocessing typically involves appending extra bits (padding) as necessary to attain an overall bit length which is a multiple of the block length 256, and often includes a block or partial block indicating the bit length of the unpadded input. Each block x_i then serves as input to an internal fixed-size hash function f (Modified MDC-2), the compression function of h , which computes a new intermediate result of bit length n for some fixed n , as a function of the previous n -bit intermediate result and the next input block x_i . Letting H_i denote the partial result after stage i , the general process for an iterated hash function with input $x = x_1x_2 \dots x_t$ can be modeled as follows:

$$H_0 = IV; H_i = f(H_{i-1}, x_i), 1 \leq i \leq t; h(x) = g(H_t)$$




Figure 3. Overview of the proposed system

H_{i-1} serves as the n -bit chaining variable between stage $i - 1$ and stage i , and H_0 is a pre-defined starting value or initializing value (IV). An optional output transformation g is used in a final step to map the n -bit chaining variable to an m -bit result $g(H_t)$; g is often the identity mapping $g(H_t) = H_t$.

3.1 Modified MDC-2 with AES

Modified MDC-2 makes use of the following pre-specified components:

- Use AES algorithm as the block cipher E_K of bit length $n = 128$ parameterized by a 128-bit key K .
- Two functions g and \tilde{g} which map 128-bit values U to suitable 128-bit AES keys as follows. For $U = u_1u_2 \dots u_{128}$, set the 2nd and 3rd bits of each byte to '10' for g , and '01' for \tilde{g}

$$g(U) = u_1 1 0 u_4 u_5 u_6 u_7 u_8 u_9 1 0 u_{12} \dots u_{128}$$

$$\tilde{g}(U) = u_1 0 1 u_4 u_5 u_6 u_7 u_8 u_9 1 0 u_{12} \dots u_{128}$$

Modified MDC-2 is illustrated in Figure 4. $E = \text{AES}$ cipher encryption




Figure 4. Modified MDC-2 hash function

INPUT: string x of bit length $r = 128 t$ for $t \geq 2$.

OUTPUT: 256-bit hash-code of x .

1. Partition x into 256-bit blocks x_i : $x = x_1x_2 \dots x_t$.
2. Choose the 128-bit non-secret constants IV, \tilde{IV} (the same constants must be used for MDC verification) from a set of recommended prescribed values. A default set of prescribed values is (in hexadecimal):
 $IV = 0x5252525252525252,$
 $\tilde{IV} = 0x2525252525252525.$

3. Let \parallel denote concatenation, and C_i^L, \tilde{C}_i^R the left and right 64-bit halves of C_i . The output is $h(x) = H_i \parallel \tilde{H}_i$.

Figure 5. Modified MDC-2 hash function algorithm

4. Experimental Result

The Figure 6 shows the analysis result of Modified MDC-2 Hash Algorithm. In this analysis, the hash value was produced 10,000 times for 10,000 random messages and 10,000 random key. And compare these 10,000 hash value. The system found no redundancy. So, the accuracy of this hash function is 100%.

Sr No	Message	Key	Hash Value	Status
9988	ICXIFPSI	FFKXWGRKZKI	0a2a89c8993026362e499139318c3c0c0a0074101c0ee3999e	OK
9989	QCKJK	YDGPB	d9f0fa3f6bb44448ce6dd0602d3db055f57802f3844c46d42d3a	OK
9990	YIGWVWDJPAV	AAWMLZLX	457b4d83ad4a3c9eae9a5d5ca736325b676f1db726afba0d1	OK
9991	MSITVASLNVHXR	UBIQO	2b5205a7f19615d9dc90ed19536ef232116eact318cc9073a4d	OK
9992	TQBHSAWO	LINPQT	b8c4b416d94180b6d056b09804aa201418e34b5880c5e56630e	OK
9993	GFPEKHEJ	ZZZPWL	688ab898f892ced40b7e05d7539900c1dc81b72e4f557cf01584	OK
9994	IOTXKOAEE	LQCYD	f015c3a15e21d40bc1a7a039578d8245d078d1c8b6f540d88e	OK
9995	UMSHPGJZ	WYFCT	75876730dcf9ce75c81650b1b927f5b0ee6192392a7acbe1db83	OK
9996	KYHPLUW	EFAEGHCN	4a67707b0d9e39e3687b8061aee08971c5098f1621d074b12c	OK
9997	FMBVAKOYT	OTHZBWDPOC	fc758011f0c9983e4ca5754d75bc6d66f19a97d62aedad6b4154	OK
9998	PAVLYLWBV	VERHOHBHTZHFV	9918f38939016c716d43812d01c168b6e55d4830aa86214052	OK
9999	GZTHLUW	KILKM	b967c7259c3f0e819a9223422e0b2f8f1b4836f42668f714e4	OK
9990	SHWYNU	ADWHA	fc62930973a8bb0b7425887121fee0a4be7d7a3880817765668f	OK
9991	YSNHXKLVH	TJWDLVDWEZ	9854f00243b0b77004c33d3c78a1df99e02d987c569623f30f	OK
9992	WROSTEEKQZDH	OKDREX	8874db9e1a23a562611395620ecea5dbf0a6e3da0a10680633	OK
9993	EMTHOQAVMRYHB	IKGPIWXYAUJU	40205d9e1f42c76d9de02233f15a98739aef18f590b74c153e	OK
9994	RLXMLVDIKA	ASUZBEJL	974388310c04e75d09b09a28c0725c144e6c5e3bc2d2d5e40d	OK
9995	YJCHOODZEBVACF	BAQYCLQBINIECB	1918d1e89d65dc99f9072cc5a4115ff2a099b40f0ee15d9e2092	OK
9996	NCXGJHHJYPYT	FRDTKPOQXVOZH	78f68c4052e66999d0255de28411a0aa33e2c7b0e67c9c327d2	OK
9997	OEJDSY	QQTEDSRLLVRFU	569ee0df91f9137a9249f32836922de62b0a499c55c0767	OK
9998	PXICBYHBCUXVE	JPXAO5F	4e9e7ada4f9f12a5975c5324e8a30d063b009e452e7ca0f9b	OK
9999	THBKPENX	MXEHCED	3a8d0b826b5e6f0dce2406f179e9272c343265d35e383b2125	OK
9990	LOGMYEDM	VFCZUAIPQFL	1e5c2958a92465429c99a09e8a805f1901824902a680839f0d	OK
9991	SNMEMLAWRMJ	VUXZYO	d03337802af87eb65f56ade9f7bb5866156f6c7527a07084d	OK
9992	SHHYSMB	YUDCFE	00c12b759e780e6f0d0c361340592cb7985e634e9401221e0f	OK
9993	ZJMBOLYNEV	WVHMGVAFSQ	a0c2bd51a0133c8ca7a99c27a8c55d0a28a34230ae7014271e61	OK
9994	WVZXYKNVNUH	WQJEWVYF	9a9bd1a1c2f8f839f59867cfa17cfae0e74a718b10e83b20c1	OK
9995	FR9FUZRI	HTNCPWVG	98d381234a7cc8b78bd0f8a67c3787890048a83d7fc593d261	OK
9996	HTDCDKLFRLLJ	WEEHUGER	0780e8f687d27468af3aa17746a0c080290f1012f18e66	OK
9997	XIRV	XQVAAOPYG	c082e8f051c5ea547bcd79c75d0c0d262460070e9bf5f7384	OK
9998	XBBJNZIDJ	HEIRGVYDK	d78c31a8946e2d738d2f49331c09a2039fa7e54e99e6405a5	OK
9999	POWBJNFUWVY	PTTEKUD	8e03531224f02b17840c210e23202170218f6c2ed989649297	OK
10000	NXNJBUCVH	QXNNBCXASVJ	97d1cae0681b2cf9309db8632cebe029e6f32685a3c172e150	OK

Figure 6. Analysis result of modified MDC-2 hash function

Table 1. Numbers of rounds for MDC-2 and modified MDC-2

Message Length (number of bits)	Number of rounds	
	MDC-2 (DES)	Modified MDC-2 (AES)
N	$\lceil N/64 \rceil$	$\lceil N/256 \rceil$
256	4	1
512	8	2
1024	16	4
2048	32	8

Table 1 shows the possible number of rounds for MDC-2 hash function and proposed Modified MDC-2 hash function. The MDC-2 hash function take 64-

bits block at each round of its processes. The Modified MDC-2 hash function take 256-bits block of message at one round and it is split as two 128-bits blocks for internal process of each round. This is obviously decreasing the number of rounds needed to process.

Modified MDC-2's Rounds = MDC-2's Rounds / 4

Input Message: Cryptographic hash functions are a third type of cryptographic algorithm. They take a message of any length as input, and output a short, fixed length hash which can be used in (for example) a digital signature. As digital signature technology becomes more widely understood and utilized, many countries world-wide are competitively developing their own signature standards for their use and applications. Hash functions are the mathematical algorithms that transform arbitrary length sequences of bits into a hash result of a fixed, limited length.

Size: 4400 bits

Number of Blocks: 18

User Key: This is test for AES key.

AES Key: 546b1cd7383fd6a5a522bcba53803d45

G: 544b5cd7585fd6c5c542dcda53c05d45

G bar: 342b3cb7383fb6a5a522bcba33a03d25

Left Encryption: 119bea5f8df43ebe4dbe98e3968bb906

Right Encryption: dbece695684ddd6dafc00385b37997

Register AB: 62f3ca39f89a5dca24d1f690b6eacb63

Register CD: 9899b7f922ebbaaf0cdfa86ae69311f6

G: 62f3ca39f89a5dca0cdfa86ae69311f6

G bar: 9899b71922ebbaaf24d1f690b6eacb63

Left Encryption: 21fd8dd0ec5f6101426fd0c02d7a3fa7

Right Encryption: d056f1fb476ebfb84f6582ee537d7d34

Register AB: 21fd8dd0ec5f6101426fd0c02d7a3fa7

Register CD: b538968f2f40fb84f6582ee537d7d34

G: 21fd8dd0ec5f61014f6582ee537d7d34

G bar: b538968f2f40fb8426fd0c02d7a3fa7

Hash Value: 21fd8dd0ec5f61014f6582ee537d7d34b538968f2f40fb8426fd0c02d7a3fa7

Figure 7. Implementation of modified MDC-2 hash function with huge length message

The Figure 7 is implementation of modified MDC-2 hash function with huge length message. In this process, input message is text and then message length has 4400 bits and 18 blocks. The hash value is 21fd8dd0ec5f61014f6582ee537d7d34b538968f2f40fb8426fd0c02d7a3fa7. In this process, modified MDC-2 takes 18 rounds and original MDC-2 takes 69 rounds for this message.

As a result, it can be concluded the larger the message size, the more decrease in number of rounds needed to process. Since the time complexity has not

considered in this current work, it can be hoped that the reducing in number of rounds may less the overall processing time.

5. Conclusion

The only weakness of MDC-2 is its block cipher. DES finally and definitively proved insecure. This casts some doubts on the security of MDC-2. This system shows a modified method for construction of hash functions based on block ciphers such as AES which is more secure than all others. And, AES cipher takes byte by byte (8-bits by 8-bits) in its process and DES cipher takes bit by bit in its process. So, the Modified MDC-2 Hash Function, that is MDC-2 with AES, is an efficient Hash Function. An effort is made the hash function MDC-2 algorithm which is modified to perform efficiently the iteration of compression function for message with huge length. The proposed system can prove that there is no redundancy upon testing 10000 times. Moreover, this hash function was designed to attain better security than original MDC-2 algorithm.

The system can be extended in several different ways. The system can be extended by changing the way of internal processes of the system to make more secure or faster. And can change the output length of the hash function in easier manner. Moreover, the block cipher can be replaced by other block cipher.

6. References

- [1] Alfred J. Menezes, Paul C. Van Oorschot and Scott A. Vanstone, Handbook of Applied Cryptography, Chapter 9: "Hash functions and data integrity". CRC Press, 1997.
- [2] Ilya Mironov. "Hash functions: Theory, attacks, and applications". Accessed on http://research.microsoft.com/users/mironov/papers/hash_survey.pdf. Last accessed on 15th of December 2006.
- [3] Lars R. Knudsen , Florian Mendel , Christian Rechberger , and Søren S. Thomsen, "Cryptanalysis of MDC-2".
- [4] Murali Krishna Reddy Danda, "Design and Analysis of Hash Functions", 2007.
- [5] Ralph C. Merkle Xerox PARC, "One Way Hash Function and DES".
- [6] <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/cryptography>
- [7] <http://www.garykessler.net/library/crypto.html>
- [8] <http://www.openbsd.org/crypto.html>